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Abstract  
The pro-poor growth concept came up in the economic literature recently and in 
the last decade a lot of researches have been dedicated to this study from many 
important international institutions and organizations. However, there are still 
disagreements on how we should intend the pro-poor growth and what kind of 
policies shall be implemented for it. Describing theoretical and analytical aspects 
of pro-poor growth, this paper represents a contribution to this literature and 
tries, in the end, to emphasize policy issues to obtain pro-poor growth.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Poverty is an everlasting topic which has attracted the interest of the most 
important international observers, as well as ending poverty became an 
international priority since it is recognized to be an essential tool for sustainable 
growth. Over the past decades, the world has registered enormous economic 
growth driven by globalization and rapid technological progress. This sustained 
period of strong economic growth over time has allowed most of countries around 
the world to lift millions of people out of extreme poverty. However, this 
phenomenon has not prevented the total reduction of poverty because the benefits 
of strong economic growth have not been evenly distributed and high levels of 
income inequality have risen further. In fact, what is supposed to be a main cause 
of poverty around the world is the inequality in the distribution of both income 
and non-income factors; in this sense, it is observed that the rising inequality is 
not an inevitable consequence of the growth process. 
This consequence has lead the main international organizations to focus 
on the following target: taking into account the links between growth, poverty and 
inequality on promoting development economic in support of the most in need. 
Pressing forward in this direction means implementing so called “pro-poor 
growth” intended as promoting growth through lower inequality by favouring 
poor individuals. 
In this way, also the main two goals of Sustainable Development Agenda 
(SDGs)1, build on the success of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
adopted by world leaders in United Nations (UN) in September 2015, are oriented 
as following: (i) end extreme poverty globally and (ii) promote shared prosperity 
in every country in a sustainable way. Following this target, the pro-poor growth 
has been identified as the main ingredient, or rather the significant policy measure, 
to achieve these goals and so, contribute to the significant reduction in poverty all 
over the world.  
However, there are still different debates about how we can define a 
significant reduction in poverty and which is the way to establish about how much 
successful countries are in succeeding in pro-poor growth. In addition, even the 
policy implications for pro-poor growth are lees clear in this context (Klasen S., 
2001). In order to head towards these issues, the main questions are emerged: first 
of all, what exactly is intended for pro-poor growth and how it can be measured? 
                                            
1 The Agenda is composed by 17 Goals addressed to all countries (poor, rich and middle-income) 
in the aim of planet protection through the prosperity promotion. Three core elements have 
been emphasized in order to achieve the sustainable development: economic growth, social 
inclusion and environmental protection. These elements are interconnected and all are crucial 
for the global welfare. 
 
At last, what kind of policies should be implemented by different countries to 
achieve pro-poor growth goal?  
In order to give answers to the questions, this paper provides a contribution 
to the literature of pro-poor growth and it is divided as following: Section 2 
provides different definitions of the concept and the linkages between poverty, 
growth and inequality as the main ingredients of it; Section 3 analyses the main 
measurements of pro-poor growth in the recent literature; and finally, Section 4 
gives a general overview about policies issues existing for the implementation of 
pro-poor growth. 
 
 
2. Pro-poor growth: definition and measurement 
The pro-poor growth concept has been evidenced as “the main ingredient 
to achieve sustainable poverty (e.g. UN, 2000 and World Bank, 2000) or, in other 
words, as growth that leads to significant reduction in poverty (OECD, 2006 and 
UN, 2000)” [Lopez J. H., 2004]. The main implementation, thus, is that growth 
must be to the benefit of the poor and give them more access to economic 
opportunities (e.g. UN, 2000; OECD, 2001). According to this implementation, 
two wide definitions (strict and general) of pro-poor growth have been emerged: 
i) growth is pro-poor when is followed by decreasing in inequality (Kakwani and 
Pernia, 2000); ii) growth is pro-poor when it simply reduces poverty (Ravallion, 
2004). 
The first, strict definition, defines pro-poor growth such as the one that 
reduces inequalities in incomes. This definition has been called also as a strong 
definition and leads that poverty is reduced when the rate of income growth of the 
poor exceeds the rate of income growth of the non-poor. Instead, the second 
definition, regarded to as a weak definition, is much more general where the pro-
poorness of growth depends on how much a chosen measure of poverty changes.  
Ravallion and Chen (2003), for example, measure pro-poor growth as the mean 
growth rate of income of the poor. Thus, “growth will always be pro-poor except 
when the incomes of the poor are stagnant or decline leading to an increase in the 
poverty measure” (Cord L., Lopez J. H., and Page J., 2003). 
Both definitions, therefore, have some limitations. The first definition, 
based more on rapid income growth for the poor, run the risk of ignoring economic 
performance of the non-poor and overlooking their welfare. Following this 
pattern, the extremal effect in a period of fast economic growth will be that the 
rate of income growth of the poor will exceed the rate of income growth of the 
non-poor, but this is going against the objective of maximizing the overall social 
welfare. On the other hand, the second definition run the risk of losing focus on 
what happens to the income and well-being of poor individuals because it focuses 
only on the poverty rate and not on the inequality as well; in other words, a period 
of a great economic growth will correspond to the general reduction of poverty 
rate, but it won’t say how much the poor effectively will benefit from the 
advantages of growth. Following similar pattern with no matter of how much the 
gains of poor are growing, might be ineffective for an international target such as 
Sustainable Development Goal. 
A similar effect compared to this latest pattern is called “trickle-down 
effect which implies a vertical flow of economic gain from the rich to the poor 
through the spending and consumption of the first. This implies that the poor will 
benefit of economic growth only indirectly and proportionally less than rich.  
(Kakwani N. and Pernia M., 2000)2. In this trend, the policies were “pro-growth” 
rather than “pro-poor” which anyway led to overall poverty reduction, but 
ultimately this process of growth was accompanied by rising inequality in income. 
In this context, making observation only from the weak definition point of view, 
the level of poverty rate will be reduced as a result of overall economic growth; 
                                            
2 For example, China’s very rapid growth and dramatic poverty reduction during the 1980s and 
1990s was not pro-poor because the poor gained relatively less than the non-poor. This 
phenomenon was due to the increasing difference between rural and urban income, caused 
exactly by internal migration from rural to urban areas. 
but looking at the level of inequality of incomes (strong definition), the reduction 
in poverty will be weak or non-existent for such a “trickle-down” effect (Pasha H. 
A., 2002). This shows how it is highly important to take into consideration 
simultaneously the relationship between growth, poverty and inequality in order 
to find efficient policies oriented on pro-poor growth. 
 
2.1. Poverty, inequality and growth 
The origin of “pro-poor growth” definition has been found also in the 
Second Principle of Rawls’ Theory of Justice (Rawls J., 1971) which is subdivided 
into other two important principles: the Fair Equality of Opportunity and the 
Difference Principle. Based on these latter two principles, social and economic 
inequalities have to satisfy two conditions: (1) they are to be attached to positions 
and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (2), 
they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society 
(Rawls J., 2001). While the first condition draw attention on the origins of 
inequality, the second one focuses on the consequences of inequality; and it is 
precisely this latter to be a useful guideline for pro-poor growth policies. The 
Difference Principle is relating to a form of equality where, under certain 
empirical conditions, differences in income have no effect on the work incentive 
of people. However, in the foreseeable future the possibility of earning greater 
income will bring forth greater productive effort and this will increase the total 
wealth of the economy and, under the Difference Principle, the wealth of the least 
advantaged. Moreover, following this principle, Rawls gives also a clear 
justification of income inequality’s “goodness” if it generates benefits for the 
whole population, and especially for the worst off. In this sense, since growth is 
required to benefit especially the worst-off, “Rawlsian theory of justice relies on 
the capacity of social and economic inequalities to generate growth, which is 
additionally required to be of the pro-poor kind if it reduces both poverty and 
inequality” (Abatemarco A., 2016). 
Despite different definitions of pro-poor growth, what clearly has been 
emerged is that this definition is strongly interlinked with three elements such as 
growth, poverty, and inequality. Ravallion (2004), for example, focuses on the 
expected change in poverty through the, so called, growth elasticity of poverty3 
and how this impact is affected by inequality. His estimates suggest that 
depending on the initial level of inequality (as measured for example by Gini 
coefficient), countries with a more equal distribution of income experience a 
greater reduction in the poverty rate for a given increase in per capita income; on 
the contrary, countries with a high initial inequality of income experience a small 
reduction in the poverty rate. Against this background, Ravallion (2004) 
concludes that "growth will be quite a blunt instrument against poverty unless that 
growth comes with falling inequality". Similar pattern has been suggested by 
Bourguignon (2003) who stated that “poverty reduction in a given country and at 
a given point of time is mostly determined by the rate of growth of the mean income 
of the population and the change in the distribution of income”.   
Furthermore, from research results conducted by Kraay (2004), the growth 
in average in income4 turns out to be mostly important for poverty reduction, but 
not sufficient if the growth in relative income5 is not taking into consideration as 
well. For this reason, more micro-level policies related to the distributional effect 
change should be implemented. 
Summing up, the strongest view suggests that economic growth can be 
pro-poor if its main result, reduction in poverty, is going hand in hand with 
                                            
3 Growth elasticity of poverty (GEP) is the percentage reduction in poverty rates associated with 
a percentage change in mean (per capita) income. Generally, the elasticity is positive since the 
increase in per capita income tend to decrease the poverty rate. However, the GEP also depends 
on other variables such as, for example, the initial level of income inequality. 
4 The empirical results suggest that in order to implement the growth in average incomes, some 
policies such as the protection of property rights, stable macroeconomic policies and openness 
to international trade, “should be at the heart of pro-poor growth strategies” (Kraay, 2004).  
5  Relative income measures the income in relation to other members of society, weighing it 
against the standards of the day. It differs from absolute income, which does not take into 
consideration those other factors, but simply reflects the total amount of individual earnings in 
a given period. 
decreasing in inequality and the impact of such a growth on poverty reduction will 
strongly depend on the initial level of income and inequality.  
Therefore, the strongest definitions of pro-poor growth prevail and 
differentiate between relative and absolute pro-poor growth. The former arises 
when economic growth benefits the poor proportionally more than the non-poor. 
This implies that while growth reduces poverty, it improves relative inequality at 
the same time because the income of the poor may increase at a faster rate than 
that of the non-poor. Conversely, a measure of pro-poor growth is absolute if the 
poor receive the absolute benefits of growth equal to, or more than, the absolute 
benefits received by the non-poor. Under this definition, absolute inequality would 
decrease during the economic growth process (Kakwani, Khandker and Son, 
2004). 
In the line with absolute notion of pro-poor growth, the inclusive growth 
concept is concerned. This concept represents an important tool for achieving a 
sustainable growth. One of the most important features of inclusive growth6 is that 
it involves a multidimensional dimension of poverty or rather the non-income 
dimensions of well-being, which includes health, education and especially the 
productive employment, rather than unidimensional which is only confined with 
income consideration. Another difference is that inclusive growth, intended in the 
sense of outcomes rather than of incomes, wants growth to benefit all stripes of 
society, including the poor, the near-poor, middle income groups, and even the 
rich. The pro-poor growth, instead, focuses on people below the poverty line or 
rather poor people (Klasen S., 2001).    
 
                                            
6 Inclusive growth is based into two broad dimensions: benefit-sharing and participation, where 
the first concerns to the decreasing level of poverty and income inequality (in this sense is strictly 
connected with pro-poor growth concept), while the second dimension looks on how the society 
is involved in the process of growth in terms of employment and it is not concerned with the 
concept of pro-poor growth (Ramos R. A., Ranieri R., Lammens J., 2013). In this latest sense of 
dimension, the inclusive growth is intended as broad-based or labour-intensive growth as well. 
2.2. Indices and indicators 
There is a variety of measurements proposed for pro-poor growth which 
strongly differ from each other depending on the definition of pro-poor growth 
one is opting for.  
Following general (weak) definition, Ravallion and Chen’s (2003) 
measurement method arises. They argue that a better measure of “pro-poor 
growth” is the mean growth rate of the poor, which indicates the direction of 
change in the level of poverty measured by the Watts index. This proposed 
measure can be derived from a “growth incidence curve” (GIC) giving rates of 
growth by quantiles of the distribution of income. The GIC indicates the mean 
growth rate (𝑔௧) in income or consumption (𝑦) between two points in time (𝑡 −
1 and 1) at each percentile of the distribution (𝑝) and it is given by: 
 
(1)          𝐺𝐼𝐶 = 𝑔௧(𝑝) =
௬೟(௣)
௬೟షభ(௣)
− 1. 
 
From the GIC then, Ravallion and Chen (2003) define the pro-poor growth 
rate (PPGR) as the mean growth rate of the poor’s income, which equals the rate 
of change in the Watts index of poverty normalized by the headcount ratio index7. 
Graphically, the PPGR corresponds to the area under the GIC up to the headcount 
ratio giving the change in the Watts index, while formally is expressed by 
 
(2)                   𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑅 = 𝑔௧
௣ = ଵ
ு೟
∫ 𝑔௧(𝑝)𝑑𝑝.   
ு೟
଴                            
 
                                            
7 Denoting z as the poverty line, which is used to classify people as poor or as not poor depending 
on which side of the line of barrier they are placed, the headcount ratio index is the proportion 
of a population whose expenditure (𝑦௜) falls below the poverty line (z). Formally is expressed as 
𝐻 = ே೛
ே
, where 𝑁௣ is the number of poor and N is the number of total population. From this, the 
Watts index is formally expressed as 𝑊 =  ଵ
ே
∑ [ln(𝑧) − ln (𝑦௜)]
௤
௜ୀଵ . This index is used by Ravallion 
and Chen (2003) because it is one of the most complete index of poverty measure since it satisfies 
the three main important axioms requested for a poverty measure introduced by Sen (1976): 
focus, monotonicity and transfers axioms. 
where 𝐻௧ is the headcount ratio at time t. In order to determine whether growth is 
pro-poor, is necessary to compare the PPGR with the growth rate in mean 
(GRIM), defined as 
 
(3)                    𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑀 = 𝛾௧ =  
ఓ೟
ఓ೟షభ
− 1, 
 
where 𝜇 is the mean income. “If the PPGR exceeds the GRIM, growth is declared 
to be pro-poor in the relative sense” (Grosse M., Harttgen K. and Klasen S., 2008).  
Similarly, Son (2004) proposes “poverty growth curve” (PGC) based on 
Atkinson’s (1987) theorem that links the generalized Lorenz curve and changes 
in poverty. The PGC measures whether economic growth is pro-poor or not pro-
poor and it can be estimated by the growth rate of mean income of the poor up to 
the 𝑝th percentile.  
Supposing here that 𝑥௣ is the per capita income (expenditure) at the 𝑝th 
percentile expressed as 𝑥௣ = 𝜇𝐿′(𝑝) where 𝐿′(𝑝) is the first derivative of the 
Lorenz curve, the PGC is obtained as  
 
(4)                        𝑟(𝑝) = 𝑔 + ∆𝐿𝑛(𝐿ᇱ(𝑝)), 
 
where 𝑟(𝑝) = ∆(𝐿𝑛൫𝑥௣൯) is the growth incidence curve (GIC) proposed by 
Ravallion and Chen (2003). “The higher this curve shifts upward, the greater the 
reduction in poverty” (Son, 2004). 
While the GIC uses 𝑟(𝑝) to measure the growth rate of per capita income 
at the pth percentile, the PGG is based on the estimation of the growth rate of the 
mean income up to the pth percentile (𝑔(𝑝)). Another important difference 
between PGC and the GIC is that this latest is derived from first-order stochastic 
dominance (Pareto dominance), while the PGC is based on second-order 
stochastic dominance (generalized Lorenz curve). As such, the GIC will provide 
more strong results than the PGC; but, given that the first-order condition implies 
the second-order condition, which may be satisfied more often than the former, 
the PGC will provide more conclusive, even if less robust, results than GIC (Son, 
2004). 
The measures suggested by Son (2004), Ravallion and Chen (2003) belong 
to the partial ordering approach since they define pro-poor growth just under the 
dominant conditions. Thus, if the dominant conditions are not met, is not possible 
to infer whether a growth process is pro-poor or not pro-poor and this represents 
the main limitation of this approach. Another limitation of the partial ordering 
approach consists in the fact that it does not include the information about the 
degree of pro-poor growth; thus, it is not possible to verify how much one growth 
process is more pro-poor than another growth process. 
The other broader (strong) definition of pro-poor growth includes the 
studies of McCulloch and Baulch (2000), Kakwani and Pernia (2000) and 
Kakwani and Son (2008), each of which suggests that a measure of pro-poor 
growth has to take into account both the poverty reduction and inequality 
improvement. Since these measures can provide information about how much the 
growth might be pro-poor, they are classified under the name of complete ordering 
approach. 
For these measures, it is therefore important to fulfil the monotonicity 
axiom which implies “for the magnitude of poverty reduction to be a 
monotonically increasing function of the pro-poor growth rate, since a poverty 
reduction depends on both growth and the distribution of its benefits among the 
poor and the non-poor” (Kakwani, Khandker and Son, 2004)8.  
McCulloch and Baulch (2000) propose a measure of pro-poor growth 
known as the poverty bias of growth (PBG) which pays a major attention on 
reducing inequality. The PBG is derived from the negative of the inequality 
component obtained from the symmetric poverty decomposition which was 
suggested by Kakwani (2000) i.e,  
 
                                            
8 A pro-poor growth measure that satisfies the monotonicity axiom provides a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the reduction of poverty because it will consider not only growth but also 
how benefits of growth are shared by individuals in society. 
(5)                      ∆𝑃 = ∆𝑃𝜇 + ∆𝑃Ψ,                                                   
 
where ∆𝑃𝜇 is the change in poverty when the distribution of inequality does not 
change, while ∆𝑃Ψ is the change in poverty when inequality changes in the 
absence of growth.  
McCulloch and Baulch (2000) propose of the poverty bias of growth 
(PBG) between two periods that can be calculated as the difference between 
poverty reduction with distributional neutral growth and poverty reduction which 
actually occurred: 
 
(6)                      𝑃𝐵𝐺 = ∆𝑃𝜇 − ∆𝑃 =  −∆𝑃Ψ.                                    
 
If the PBG is positive, this indicates a pro-poor bias of growth; if it is 
negative, growth has an anti-poor bias (Zaman K., Khan M. M. and Ahmad M., 
2010). However, the PBG does not always satisfy the monotonicity criterion. 
“Higher values of the PBG may not imply a greater reduction in poverty because 
poverty also depends on the growth effect. Thus, the PBG will only satisfy the 
monotonicity criterion if it is assumed that the growth effect is constant (which is 
highly unlikely)” (Kakwani, Khandker and Son, 2004). 
An alternative measure proposed by Kakwani and Pernia (2000) is the pro-
poor growth index (PPGI) which measures the degree of poverty and it is derived 
from the relation between total poverty reduction and poverty reduction in the case 
of distribution-neutral growth. This relationship is expressed in terms of ratio of 
the poverty elasticities. 
Supposing the income x of an individual is a random variable with a 
density function f(x), and z is the poverty line, then a general class of additively 
decomposable poverty measures can be written as 
 
(7)                         𝜃 = ∫ 𝑃(𝑧, 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥௭଴ ,                                             
 
where 𝑃(𝑧, 𝑥) is a homogenous function of degree zero in 𝑧 and 𝑥, while 𝑓(𝑥) is 
the density function of x and  డ௉
డ௫
 < 0, డ
మ௉
డ௫మ
 > 0, 𝑃(𝑧, 𝑧) = 09. 
Kakwani and Son (2008) define the growth elasticity of poverty as “the 
ratio of the proportional change in poverty to the proportional change in the mean 
income”, which is obtained by the total differential of (7) as 
 
(8)                         𝛿 = ௗ௅௡(ఏ)
ఊ
= ଵ
ఏఊ ∫
డ௉
డ௫
𝑥(𝑝)𝑔(𝑝)𝑑𝑝ு଴ , 
 
where 𝛾 = 𝑑𝐿𝑛(𝜇) is the growth rate of mean income and 𝑔(𝑝) = 𝑑𝐿𝑛(𝑥(𝑝)) is 
the growth rate of the income of people at the pth percentile. Thus, 𝛿 is the 
percentage change in poverty resulting from a growth rate of 1 percent in the mean 
income. 
Consequently, the poverty reduction depends on two factors: i) the first is 
the magnitude of the economic growth rate (the larger the growth rate, the greater 
the reduction in poverty); ii) the second is the change in inequality (an increase in 
inequality reduces the impact of growth on poverty reduction). These two factors 
can be expressed by the decomposition of (8) as the sum of two components:  
 
(9)                      𝛿 = 𝜂 + 𝜁. 
 
                                            
9 Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) proposed a class of poverty measures that is obtained by 
substituting in (7) the quation 𝑃(𝑧, 𝑥) = ቀ௭ି௫
௭
ቁ
ఈ
, where 𝛼 is the parameter of inequality aversion. 
For  𝛼 = 0, the headcount ratio is obtained (𝜃 = 𝐻) which gives equal weight to all poor 
irrespective of the intensity of their poverty. For 𝛼 = 1, each poor is weighed by his or her 
distance from the poverty line and this measure is called the poverty gap ratio. For 𝛼 = 2, the 
weight given to each poor is proportional to the square of his or her income shortfall from the 
poverty line and this measure is called the severity of poverty ratio. 
 
 𝜂 is the neutral relative growth elasticity of poverty derived by Kakwani (1993) 
and it is always negative10, while 𝜁 shows the effect of inequality on poverty 
reduction. The PPIG index then can be expressed as: 
 
(10)                   𝜑 = ఋ
ఎ
 
 
The growth is pro-poor when 𝜑 is greater than 1. Otherwise, the growth is 
negative or relatively pro-poor, in the sense that the growth is proportionally less 
for the poor than for the non-poor. Finally, the growth is said neutral, when 𝜑 = 1 
and everyone benefits of the same proportion from the growth. 
Nevertheless, even though the PPIG captures the distribution of growth 
benefits among the poor and nonpoor, it does not take into consideration the level 
of the actual growth rate. This means, it does not satisfy the monotonicity axiom.  
In response to this, Kakwani and Son (2008 ) proposed another pro-poor 
growth measure called the poverty equivalent growth rate (PEGR) which includes 
both the growth rate in mean income and how the benefits from growth are 
distributed between the poor and the non-poor.  
The PEGR is the growth rate 𝛾∗ that would result in the same proportional 
change in poverty as the present growth rate 𝛾 if the growth process was not 
followed by any change in relative inequality. Formally is expressed as: 
 
(11)             𝛾∗ = ቀఋ
ఎ
ቁ 𝛾 = 𝜑𝛾. 
 
The equation (11) implies that growth is pro-poor (anti-poor) if 𝛾∗ is 
greater (less) than 𝛾. When 𝛾∗ > 𝛾, the growth is pro-poor in relative sense.  If  
0 < 𝛾∗ < 𝛾, the growth reduces poverty but at the same time increases inequality. 
Practically, this situation results in trickle-down process where the poor receive 
                                            
10 Neutral relative growth means that growth does not change the relative inequality and thus, 
everyone on society receive the same proportional benefits from growth. 
proportionally less benefit from growth than the non-poor. What is more, the 
growth can be defined as “super pro-poor” or absolute pro-poor growth if 𝛾∗ >
𝛾 ቀఎ
∗
ఎ
ቁ, where 𝜂∗is the elasticity of poverty with respect to that growth which is 
equally shared between every individual in society (everyone receives the same 
benefits from growth). 
It has been noted by Kakwani, Khandker and Son (2004) that the PEGR 
can be calculated separately for the entire class of poverty measures including the 
headcount ratio, poverty gap ratio, severity of poverty index, and Watts measure. 
An advantage of this measure is that it takes into account both the greatness of 
growth and the benefits of growth the poor receive. Moreover, the PEGR satisfies 
the basic monotonicity criterion such that the proportional reduction in poverty is 
a monotonically increasing function of the PEGR. To accelerate the reduction in 
poverty, it is suggested that the PEGR be maximized, rather than the growth rate 
alone. 
 
 
3. Empirical evidences 
 
From the pro-poor growth pattern, none consensus has been found about 
how specifically it has to be defined and how it can be measured. The five 
alternative measures proposed have they merits and limitations, but none of them 
is recommended over the other. The broad consensus from the literature, however, 
is that growth alone is not enough to guarantee the sustainable reduction of 
poverty, but keeping inequality into consideration is equally important. 
Nevertheless, the reduction of poverty as well as the reduction of 
inequality is generally not an overriding objective of government policies. Quite 
the opposite, in many countries, governments are making policies that are, 
knowingly or unknowingly, in favour of the rich rather than of the poor and this 
hampers the achievement of pro-poor target. Thus, the main goal now is to find 
what kind of issues continue to exist behind the political action overall, taking into 
consideration both developing and developed countries.  
A first step towards to finding out these policies issues is to glance on how 
the poverty is identified across the countries. On this matter, absolute definition 
of poverty can be distinguished from relative concept. The farmer can be also 
defined as “extreme poverty” and it is generally calculated by headcount index 
which classify poor as those with level income or consumption per day below 
US$1,90 (PPP) threshold of international poverty line11. The latter, instead, 
involves a comparison of the incomes (or expenditures) of poor households with 
those of the rich and it is measured by indicators such as the Gini coefficient. 
Looking at poverty in absolute terms, the empirical analysis of World 
Bank research shows that, while in 1981 about 44 % of population across countries 
were living below the poverty line12, getting on in years this estimation has 
decreased more and more until reaching levels below 10,7 % (776.6 millions) in 
2013. This means that most of the countries have made a huge effort to bring 
billions of people out of the poverty in extreme conditions. The first ones to put 
an end to this rate were the industrialized countries which experienced a rapid and 
strong economic growth in the last decades. A very rapid reduction of absolute 
poverty has been experienced especially in East Asia and Pacific regions, from 
60 % in 1990 to 3,5 % in 2013 (World Bank, 2016).  
However, the challenge is not over yet and some countries still have to 
face up with, especially Sub – Saharan Africa which had the world’s largest 
headcount ratio (41.0%) and housed the largest number of the poor (389 million) 
in 2013 (almost half of total global population) (World Bank, 2016). This 
challenge has been taken by several important international and national 
                                            
11 When the Millennium Development Goals were first published, the international poverty line 
was set at earning $1 a day. In 2008, the World Bank pushed the line to $1.25 in order to recognize 
the higher price levels in several developing countries than previously estimated. Finally, from 
the recent developments, this poverty line was revised again in 2015. Since then a person is 
recognised to be in extreme (or absolute) poverty if he or she is living on less than 1.90 
international $ per day. 
12 The data have used the International Poverty Line fixed at 1.90 international $ per day. 
organizations, including the UN, the World Bank and the United States Federal 
Government which have set a new target for a new MDG to end extreme poverty 
by 2030 and this implies reducing the poverty headcount ratio from 10.7 % 
globally in 2013 to 3.0 %13 in 2030. 
From this point of view, it could be said that poverty reduction is towards 
the end very soon. The great industrialization, expansion of the existing markets 
and phenomenon of globalization have all contributed to the rising economic 
growth and hence, reduction of poverty in the last decades. But looking on poverty 
from relative point of view, which means looking especially on inequality rate or 
namely how the benefits of growth had been shared between poor and non-poor, 
the scenario is not such positive as above.  
During the same decades, the growth was not properly shared among 
people and this contributed to increase the level of income inequality. The new 
way of thinking about poverty is in relative terms which has been defined as the 
condition in which people lack the minimum amount of income needed in order 
to maintain the average standard of living in the society they live. In accordance 
with this definition, relative poverty is more common than absolute or extreme 
poverty in developed countries and it is becoming the most useful indicator, used 
by the most important international organisation such as UNDP, UNICEF, OCED 
for ascertaining poverty rates in wealthy developed nations. 
In other words, people in developed countries are considered poor to the 
wealth of others when they cannot participate in that society because of lack of 
resources, or rather because of inequality of opportunities. Whereas the relevance 
to the matter of standard of living relative to deprived people in a country, the 
poverty can be measured as half of the national median household income. The 
main poverty line used in the OECD and the European Union is a relative poverty 
measure based on "economic distance", a level of income usually set at 60% of 
the median household income. 
                                            
13 Another second target with equal importance is to promote shared prosperity in every country 
in a sustainable way. This means fostering the growth in the income or the consumption 
expenditure of the poorest 40 % of the population (the bottom 40) in each country. 
Looking at the most developed countries together in Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), there is a wide gap between 
poor and rich started gradually to increase from 2000s. This gap is due to the 
increasing household incomes which has grown faster for the richer than for the 
poorest14, causing booming in income inequality. 
In 2010, the inequality of income was on average around 0.31 in OECD 
countries, ranging from a low of 0.25 in Iceland and Slovenia to a high of 0.50 in 
Chile. While, looking on the poverty gap rate which measures the intensity of 
poverty living on average below a poverty line, around 11 % of the population 
across the 34 OECD countries fell below the poverty threshold. This was differing 
from the minimum, 6 % in Denmark and the Czech Republic, to 20 % and more 
in Israel and Mexico (Martin J. P. and Förster M., 2014). 
This means that inequality and poverty do not necessarily go hand-in-
hand, and even some countries such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, Finland have 
yielded positive results on reducing poverty with poverty rate gap below the 
average of OECD countries, their level of inequality increased at the same time. 
The USA is a blatant example of a developed country which boasts the 
highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the world, but this impressive growth 
was accompanied by a sharp increase in inequality in years. From 1990s till 2010, 
in fact, the USA ranked fourth to have the highest (0.36) Gini coefficient of 
income inequality within 34 OECD countries (at first place Chile with 0.50, 
Mexico is placed at second with 0.46 and third Turkey with 0.41)15. 
                                            
14 Various hypotheses have been put forward to explain the widening income gap, ranging from 
globalization to technological changes to demographic trends. However, one of the most 
common reasons given is the growing concentration of income among high-income earners. This 
increment was principally due to the greater inequality in wages and salaries. The rich households 
faring much better than both low and middle-income families in most of countries. This has often 
been attributed to higher shares of labour income, partly due to the development of stock 
options which are reported as part of wages and salaries (OECD, 2008).   
 
15 Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-
database.htm), accessed in December 2013. 
To bring about pro-poor growth analysis, it is opportune to take into 
consideration the poverty in relative terms rather than in absolute terms. Some 
empirical researches suggest that in the last three decades the impact of pro-poor 
growth on poverty in developing countries was different, depending mostly from 
initial level of inequality and political reforms conducted for the poverty reduction 
strategies. Following, for example, Kakwani and Pernia (2000) study about some 
Asian countries using the pro-poor growth index, the results indicate that in Korea 
the growth has generally been highly pro-poor. Conversely, in Thailandia the 
growth was not such as pro-poor even though it has considerably reduced the level 
of poverty. The main finding, however, is that growth has been more pro-poor in 
the rural areas rather than in urban areas. In the same line, Ravallion and Datt 
(2002), in conducting an analysis about the impact of growth on various states in 
India, suggest that in urban areas the impact of pro-poor growth is more obvious 
to identify. What is more, Fan et al. (2008) study suggest that in India the pro-
poor growth must be implemented by enhancing the agricultural productivity in 
rural areas which represents the main survival factor for most of developing 
countries including Africa, Latin America and Asia. Similar results have been 
found by another study conducted by Cord L. (2007) who compared eight 
developing countries16 succeeded in pro-poor growth experience. Despite 
different insights for poverty reduction strategies conducted by eight countries, 
some common strategies which sustained growth in favour of poor emerged: 
creation of new and more accessible jobs to poor households, making agricultural 
activities more productive, improving access to markets and technology, 
strengthening the participation of woman in labour market and investment in 
human capital especially in secondary education. 
 Looking instead on developed countries, the scenario of the last three 
decades suggests that economic growth was accompanied by widening 
inequalities in household disposable income. This means that instead of pro-poor 
growth, there has been a growth that favoured rich more than poor.  Some studies 
                                            
16 . Bangladesh, Brazil, Ghana, India; Indonesia; Tunisia; Uganda and Vietnam. 
focusing on top incomes have shown that the shares of the richest 1% in total pre-
tax incomes have increased in most OECD countries in the past three decades, 
with highest concentration in English-speaking, some Nordic countries and 
Southern European countries (OECD, 2014). Conversely, from another study 
based on relative poverty (inequality poverty with respect to the mean) across 
OECD countries analysis it appears a wide number of low- income people which 
differs across countries: in Mexico and Israel around 20% of the whole population 
is below the low- income threshold of 50% of median income, while only 6% in 
the Czech Republic (Causa, O. et al., 2014). A way to compare how low-income 
people have benefited from economic growth in the last decades is proposed by 
OECD analysis based on comparison between trends in household incomes on 
average and trends in GDP per capita (OECD, 2015). The results, relating to 
around half of OECD countries for which data was available, show that the GDP 
growth was substantially higher than household’s income growth especially for 
the households at the bottom lower quintile distribution. Better distribution instead 
was for the disposable incomes in the middle of distribution. The main divergence 
anyway of growing gap with respect to the median incomes was particularly 
pronounced in countries such as Israel, Sweden, Spain, Finland and United States. 
This divergence regarding GDP growth which has been accompanied by 
growing income disparities over the past three decades, has different mitigating 
factors which are explained in the section bellow where some policy implications 
are given as well. 
 
 
4. Policy implications  
 
Several causes have been identified behind the divergence in advanced 
economies. First of all, whilst globalization and technological progress have been 
the main factors to launch the rapid global economic growth, on the other hand 
they affected the rising inequality among countries as well. Globalization has 
driven many developed countries towards the convenience to invest more and 
more directly in other countries, so-called emerging economies, such as China and 
India. But this, at the same time, has provoked less export and thus, less 
development and job in some important sectors such as rural and agriculture. 
Technological progress, in turn, has benefited more the high-skills workers rather 
than those with low-skills. Nowadays, enterprises demand for high-skills workers 
is rising as well as the earnings of these latest. This provokes the growing gap 
between high- and low-skilled workers earnings.  
Other factors that have contributed to the greater wage inequality are 
regulatory reforms and institutional changes. These, from one side, played a 
positive role in increasing employment opportunities through recruiting more and 
more low-paid workers and/or adopting part-time job contracts in order to 
strengthen competition in the markets for goods and services and to make labour 
markets more adaptable. On the other side, however, the continuing rise of low-
paid workers and contractual changes in working conditions have also contributed 
to increase the income wages17 inequality (OECD, 2011). Strictly connected with 
this argument is the Premium Wage which represents one of the most analysed 
issues especially in labour economics. Usually, some employees receive 
additional payments (e.g. pay holiday) which may jeopardise the wages between 
low-paid and high-paid workers and thus, contribute to the widening wage 
inequality. This issue should not be overlooked since it could be a significant 
factor to influence the pro-poor growth indicators for OECD countries. 
Finally, what is strongly causing this divergence in advanced economies 
are the taxes and benefits structures became less effective in redistributing income. 
                                            
17 The distribution of non-wage incomes has generally also become more unequal. It has been 
observed that the capital income inequality increased more than earnings inequality in two-
thirds of OECD countries, even though the share of capital income in total household income 
remains modest on average at around 7% (OECD, 2011). From the same observation, the changes 
in family structures (smaller than before because of the one or without children) have been seen 
as one of the likely reason to increase earnings and income inequality. “Smaller households are 
less able to benefit from the savings associated with pooling resources and sharing expenditures” 
(OECD, 2011). 
 
Public cash transfers, as well as income taxes and social security contributions, 
are playing a major role in all OECD countries in reducing market-income18 
inequality. Together, they were estimated to reduce inequality among the 
working-age population (measured by the Gini coefficient) by an average of about 
one-quarter across OECD countries. This redistributive effect in the late 2000s 
was larger in the Nordic countries, Belgium and Germany, but well below average 
in Chile, Iceland, Korea, Switzerland and the United States (OECD, 2011). The 
main reasons for the decline in redistributive government capacity are found on 
the benefit side: cuts to benefit levels, tightening of eligibility rules to contain 
expenditures for social protection and the failure of transfers to the lowest income 
groups, etc. For example, despite the USA prides itself as a land of opportunity, 
the most economically disadvantaged groups in community (immigrants, low-
paid workers, pensioners, etc.) are excluded from these opportunities. This 
exclusion is particularly remarkable for the most important public services: 
institution and health.  
Taking into consideration all the main causes that have provoked the 
divergence between economic growth and rising inequality over the last decades, 
it can be said that an important issue related to the policy makers from the pro-
poor growth point of view is that they run the risk to diverting attention of public 
policies real role and ensure that the gains from economic growth that reach the 
poor are sufficient to reduce the incidence of absolute poverty and not of the 
relative poverty as well. 
It seems that so far, the economic literature has just assumed that the policy 
objective is to maximise the rate at which absolute poverty is reduced. From this 
point of view, in fact, the positive results certainly have been achieved, but the 
consideration of poverty in relative terms has been overlooked. The economic 
                                            
18 Market income is identified as a pre-tax-transfer income in terms of the sum of income from 
market sources (such as wages and salaries, self-employed income, capital income, benefits from 
private pensions or insurances, and other private transfers). It differs from disposable income 
which determines what remains after subtracting income taxes and social security taxes and 
adding welfare transfers lead to post-tax-transfer income. 
imbalance, gender disparities and social exclusion are still affecting even those 
countries which have escaped the extreme condition of poverty. This must be 
prevented with huge efforts especially now when following the recent events 
around the world such as civil wars, huge migration flows and political instability, 
increasing inequality and poverty are always put at risk if austerity policies are not 
well balanced. 
Nevertheless, all the measures proposed in the section above are focus on 
the income dimension of poverty, but according to the recent studies emphasizing 
on multidimensional aspects of poverty such as health, education and gender 
equity are important as well (e.g. World Bank, 2000a, UN, 2000). In particular, 
focusing on the role of human capital has been identified as one of the main key 
factors to better understand the impact of inequality on growth, especially in 
developed countries (Galor O. and Moav O., 2004). 
As evidenced also from the Fair Equality of Opportunity principle of 
Rawls (1975), what is important for economy is not just the distribution of 
material goods and services but also the distribution of opportunities19. This latter 
can be understood as equal opportunities for education, health care, etc. and which 
represent as well effective rules to put out the formal discriminations such as a 
person's race, ethnicity, age or gender. In fact, the Fair Equality of Opportunity 
principle “requires that citizens have the same educational and economic 
opportunities regardless of whether they were born rich or poor” (Abatemarco, 
2016).  
To sum up, in order to find a way for the policies to be oriented on pro-
poor growth, it should be firstly underlined the differences between emerging and 
advanced economies. According to the country and it initial inequality level, 
different policies implications should be found. From empirical evidences some 
                                            
19 Rawls’ point of view about opportunity intended as a “chance of access to resources” differs 
from Sen’s (1983), who emphasis more on “equality of outcome” or “chance of outcome” rather 
than “equality of opportunity”. Thus, form Sen’s capabilities approach, a society is committed to 
guarantee the equalization of capabilities when it has the that ability to lead a human life with 
reasonable longevity, nutrition, health, and social functioning. 
 
experiences suggest that more proactive investment in the rural areas, trough the 
enhancement of the productivity in agriculture sector, is essential for sustainable 
pro-poor growth in developing countries (Zorgui I. et al, 2016). Some 
macroeconomics policies such as business environment transparency and inflation 
control, have also been identified as good indices for the stability of a country in 
order to attract more domestic investment and foreign capital inflows. Last but 
not least, development of the private sector including support to the small-medium 
enterprises (SME) is equally important. When government policies promote the 
supply and demand for products and services that people produce, this definitely 
encourage the pro-poor growth. Supporting SME development in this sense is 
important: since the small-medium enterprises are responsible for the most 
industry activity, the government should pay more attention on how to finance 
their business. 
In regard to developed countries, one of the big divergence refers to the 
growing gap between wages. This issue can be handled by creating better and 
well-paid jobs for the low-skills workers, enhance the employment benefits for 
the low-skills workers, improving the employment opportunities of those not 
working, improving the general skills level through broader access to high-quality 
education and sustaining young people even without high level of education to be 
oriented on start-up initiatives through public financial support. Creating better 
and well-paid jobs, for example, can be achieve by making more use of in work 
benefits which encourage people to take up paid work and give additional income 
support to low-income households. Nevertheless, having a real career prospects 
and hopeless on being well paid, will encourage households to make more effort 
on education of their children.  This distributive aspect is assumed to impact on 
growth to the extent that “the magnitude of (expected) income inequalities is said 
to influence (ongoing) individual incentives to effort in education, and so (future) 
productivity in the labour market” (Abatemarco A. and Stroffolini F., 2017). 
Still on the subject of employment, more employment protection 
legislation is needed in order to reduce the gap in the degree of protection between 
temporary and regular contracts. The same legislation should be supplemented by 
adequate unemployment benefits which should be at the same time not so 
incentive to being long term unemployed.   
Finally, reforming tax and benefit policies is the third key to promote a 
better distribution of income as the most direct instruments to redistribute income. 
In fact, there is a correlation between pro-poor growth and tax progressivity: a 
fiscal system is called progressive (regressive) if it redistributes income favouring 
the poor (rich). It has been demonstrated that developed countries such as Nordic 
and Anglo-Saxon countries which have pursued a more progressive tax and 
benefit policies, have been the most successful on reducing poverty and inequality 
as well (OECD, 2008). While, the countries who stands out for achieving the same 
goals through the tax and benefit system are Asian countries (Japan and Korea) 
and also the United States. In conclusion, taxation and benefit transfers can be an 
efficient policy tool for pro-poor growth because on the one side it can minimize 
inequality in the income distribution in favour of poor (and so reducing relative 
poverty) and on the other side, it can likely affect diverse aspects of human 
behaviour thanks to which more inclusive growth can be achieved.  
However, pro-poor growth looks mostly on income aspects of the poverty 
rather than non-income which is important exactly in the same way or even more. 
For this reason, inclusive growth should be considered as the main tool to achieve 
the reduction of poverty from income and non-income way, and pro-poor growth 
as the main device of income way. 
From this point of view common policies implementation can be suggested 
for both developing and developed countries.  
First of all, investing in human capital is the most important tool ever, 
focusing especially on guaranteeing the girls education. The policy challenge here 
is to improve access to, and the quality of, education since the early childhood 
period. Then, once the transition from school to work has been accomplished 
successfully, there must be sufficient incentives for workers and employers to 
invest in skills throughout the working life. This will ensure the equality of 
opportunity for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Moreover, following 
the Rawlsian Difference Principle, once education opportunities are granted to the 
entire population, inequalities are admitted as far as they are to the greatest benefit 
of the well-off (i.e. least-advantaged). In this sense, inequality must be aimed at 
pro-poor growth (Abatemarco A. and Stroffolini F., 2017).  
It is also important to guarantee the equal opportunity to the public health 
access. All people must to have the cleaner water to drink, more nutritious food to 
eat, higher-quality air to breathe, and access to a broad range of services to 
promote human health, from vaccines and doctors to public parks. Worker with 
more healthy life will contribute more to the labour force and thus to the economic 
growth. What is more, some countries, such as China, have registered a significant 
reduction in poverty thanks to the public expensive on health.  
Gender equity is another tool which besides being a human right, is 
important to guarantee the equality of opportunity between men and women. 
Nowadays, women are still generally underrepresented in economic and political 
spheres of life. Removing these barriers for women through economic 
empowerment and political participation, is essential for achieving poverty 
reduction and inclusive growth promotion.  
Finally, going back to the tax and transfer public policies, which was 
drawn for the advanced countries, these are the most direct policies impacting to 
the income distribution but at the same time they affect the non-income aspects of 
population. More equal distribution of income and public transfers will ensure 
more social and political stability in a country. Aggregate demand will be 
increased when resources are redistributed from richer households to poor 
households with a higher propensity to save. Equality in income will generate 
protectionist sentiments and people will in longer support open trade and free 
markets. This will also influence positively so called inter-generational income 
mobility - also known as social mobility - which is one of the possible measures 
of equality of opportunity (Abatemarco A., 2016)20.  
                                            
20 Inter-generational differs from intra-generational mobility which “is not immediately related 
with equality of opportunity, but it is commonly understood to characterize more meritocratic 
societies, e.g. with less rigidities in the labour market” (Abatemarco A., 2016). 
Such as kind of system is called progressive. Otherwise, when the public 
transfers are favouring rich at the cost of poor, is called regressive. Meanwhile, 
progressive public programme is always pro-poor but policy maker should take 
into account both, efficiency and effectiveness on their achievement of anti-
poverty programme according to socio-demographic and socio-economic 
structures of their country. Pursuing effectively these goals can help to achieve 
also other objectives such as promote intergenerational social mobility and 
equality of opportunity which are essential tools for promoting inclusive growth 
and reducing poverty in long term. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The general remarks suggest that despite the relevance of economic 
growth, which has been essential for poverty reduction in absolute sense in the 
last decades, it is in itself not sufficient for the alleviation of poverty in relative 
sense as well.  
From this view, it is important to understand that poverty doesn’t mean the 
same for everyone around the world. Usually poverty is thought in absolute terms, 
namely deprivation of basic needs, e.g. not having access to food, water and 
shelter. However, poverty exists in developed countries as well and it should be 
considered in terms of relative deprivation related to a social context and the 
degree of participation in it. Obviously, a sustained period of strong economic 
growth has allowed emerging economies to lift millions of people out of absolute 
poverty; but, the benefits of strong economic growth have not been evenly 
distributed and high levels of income inequality have risen further. 
                                            
 
Thus, there is an evidence that income distribution and economic growth 
both matter for poverty reduction and policies measures must be oriented in both 
pro-poor and pro-growth spheres.  
In response to the original questionings, a clear relationship between 
growth, inequality and poverty is supported by existing empirical evidences. They 
should never be considered separately but unlike, going hand in hand. Economic 
growth is an essential tool to pursue poverty reduction but is, in itself, not 
sufficient if the high levels of inequality continue to be persistent. Thus, the 
economic growth should be pursued with equity and complemented by policies 
that enable the poorest to fully participate in and benefit from the growth process. 
Considering this latest aspect, policy makers should seek out and implement 
policies and public actions that increase the benefits of growth to the poor rather 
than to the rich. 
However, empirical results show that developing countries which 
experimented similar pro-poor growth policies have not always achieved the same 
positive results. As well as developed countries, which joined the common 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, have not always 
achieved the similar rate of equality redistribution and social inclusion of their 
citizens as the main result of economic growth. This means that each country 
having different political and economic situation has to deal with specific internal 
macroeconomic policies implemented by international pro-poor growth solutions. 
What is clear is that policies oriented on inclusive growth are much more 
than pro-poor growth: investment on education, health, gender equality and social 
inclusion are the foundations for the sound economy. If the construction of these 
foundations cannot be guaranteed, then the economic progress and technological 
innovation will have a negative impact on the human well-being in long term. 
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